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Abstract. This paper dwells on the trend of considering storytelling practices 
as anchored in play-pretend (e.g. Boyd 2009) and attempts at pointing to some 
of the implications of such an approach that have not so far been discussed, such 
as the problem of proper framing of a narrative, i.e. a story told. In order to provide 
the instances of possible framing designs and signals for narratives, the paper first 
outlines  the  general  characteristics  of  play  in  animals  that  seem  significant  from 
the perspective of this very undertaking; then, it elaborates on the theory of art – 
and storytelling – as adaptation evolved from play (cf. Boyd 2009). Subsequently, 
it discusses play frames and pre-play exchange, as understood, primarily, by Gregory 
Bateson (1972), and, finally, applies these to the study of narrative media and forms.
Keywords: play; pre-play exchange; play frame; metacommunication signal; 
cognitive narratology; narrative; framing narratives. 
1. Introduction
One of the most interesting outcomes of approaching culture from 
a cognitive and an evolutionary standpoint is the theory of art and 
storytelling as an adaptation. To use Jonathan Gottschall words, “[t]he mind 
is a storyteller” (Gottschall 2012: 87); man, in turn, is “the storytelling 
animal” (Swift in Gottschall 2012:87). Indeed, it seems that, as Christopher 
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Collins puts it, “imaginative literature relies on and reactivates the deepest 
layers of our cognitive architecture and, in so doing, shows us the way 
down those neural pathways of our ancestral past” (Collins 2013: 57). What 
is the past of art? What is its function? In order to answer these questions, 
some scholars – for instance, Brian Boyd (2009) – have decided to compare 
the patterns for engaging in art to that of other behaviours observable 
in the animal kingdom, ultimately coming to the conclusion that artistic 
activity – inclusive of storytelling – found in humans is much connected with 
animal play. But even though art in general has been thoroughly analysed 
in the context of play, there is still little research on the exact workings 
of storytelling as a play activity. The purpose of this paper is, then, to point 
to the implications of seeing storytelling practices in humans as anchored 
in animal play connected with the processes of providing a proper play frame 
for narratives, i.e. signalling play intentions by the players. 
2. Animal Play
Play  seems  to  be  a  universal  in  all mammals,  but  also  in  birds,  fish,  and 
reptiles (Boyd 2009: 91). Actually, all animals that have been observed for 
play behaviour, proved to display it. Ethological research1, which has so far 
been the main source of evidence on play (Burghardt 2005: 10), is crucial for 
understanding play, “addressing [its] evolutionary origins” and “its associated 
functions” (Burghardt and Graham 2010: 394). What has been determined 
about play so far? Since play is difficult to define, though we intuitionally 
recognise it both in our own as well as in other species (Burghardt and 
Graham 2010: 393–394), “when it comes to making theoretical statements 
about what play is, we fall into silliness” (Sutton-Smith 1997: 1). In order 
to briefly characterise play for the purposes of this paper without falling into 
too much of  silliness,  let  us first  consider  an  example  of  behaviour  often 
observed in common ravens, here described by Bern Heinrich and Rachel 
Smolker:
Observers from Alaskan and Northern Canadian towns routinely 
reported to us seeing ravens slide down steep snow covered roofs, 
only to fly or walk back up and repeat the slide. Ravens in our Maine 
aviary also roll down mounds of snow, and even do so on their 
backs with a stick held in the feet! David Lidstone, observing 
 1 Especially in non-human animals and children (Burghardt and Graham 2010: 395).
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ravens  at  a  deer  carcass  in  Maine  during  the  first  snow  storm 
of  the year,  reported  that  ‘at  least  three birds flew up  to a stump 
on a 2–3 m incline, and then slid down the slope on their backs. 
Twice the sliding bird was holding a stick in its talons’. Gwinner 
(1966) reported seeing his captive ravens repeatedly sliding down 
a board. We see no obvious utilitarian function for sliding behavior. 
Perhaps it is a social display (not necessarily play) involved 
in securing status or mates by ‘showing off’ or drawing attention 
to themselves. (Heinrich and Smolker 1998: 36)
The phenomenon alluded to above is actually an example of what within 
play studies has been called ‘locomotor play’. Apart from (A) locomotor 
play, which involves exaggerated movement, such as jumping (or sliding 
down roofs covered with snow), animals tend to engage in (B) manipulative 
play, i.e. playing with objects, and (C) social play, which embeds chasing, 
nipping, and so on (Burghardt 2005: 15). Importantly, both object and social 
play derive from locomotor play (Burghardt 2005: 15). Social play, in turn, 
can also contain elements of the two others (Collins 2013: 67)2. The types 
of play are, then, by no means independent (Burghardt 2010: 340).
The most common type of play among animals is probably pretended 
combat – also called “rough-and-tumble” (R&T) play or “play-fighting” – 
or, at least, it is the type of play that has been most frequently studied 
(Burghardt and Graham 2010: 395). As Gregory Bateson reports in his essay 
“A Theory of Play and Fantasy”, when he went to the Fleishhacker Zoo 
in San Francisco, he “saw two young monkeys playing, i.e., engaged in an 
interactive sequence of which the unit actions or signals were similar to but 
not the same as those of combat. It was evident, even to the human observer, 
that the sequence as a whole was not combat, and evident to the human 
observer that to the participant monkeys this was ‘not combat’” (Bateson 
1972: 185). Play thus contains two contrary premises: (1) that something 
is what it is (e.g. monkeys are chasing one another, putting in actual effort 
and energy), and (2) that the very same thing is not what it is (e.g. in this 
context, chasing does not indicate actual hostility), but stands for something 
else (cf. Collins 2013: 63–64). In other words, a play behaviour “is not and, 
 2  This  is  not  the  only  classification  present  in  play  studies,  though; Burghardt  and 
Graham refer, for instance, to the taxonomy introduced by Fagen, in which play is divided 
into: “(1) solitary locomotor-rotational play; (2) object play; and (3) social play” (Fagen 1981 
in Burghardt and Graham 2010: 394). Importantly, no matter to what taxonomy we stick, we 
have to bear in mind that “the boundaries of two or more play categories are often blurred, and 
individual categories are often subdivided” (Burghardt and Graham 2010: 394).
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at the same time, is what it represents to the player” (Collins 2013: 64). This 
cognitive split can be called, after Christopher Collins, a kind of a “magical 
doubleness” (2013: 64).
The “magical doubleness” alongside all the physical effort put in actions 
accompanying play add up to certain costs in energy and time. Moreover, 
playing is also connected with the risk of “injury from falls or aggressive 
retaliation,” or “conspicuousness of play to predators” (Burghardt and 
Graham 2010: 399). Interestingly, despite the costs, and despite the universal 
character of play, as Heinrich and Smolker admit at one point of their 
subchapter about ravens snow-sliding, it is difficult to discern an “obvious 
utilitarian function” in this type of behaviour. Indeed, the crucial characteristic 
of play is that it is seemingly purposeless. Seemingly, for it is not the case 
that it serves no purpose, it is just that the purpose is not instantly observable3 
(e.g. Collins 2013: 63). 
Why, then, do animals play? Or, in other words, “what actually is the fun 
of playing?”  (Huizinga 1980: 2). One of  the “postponed” benefits of play 
is learning: perfecting particular skills and scripts (cf. Boyd 2009: 92). More 
specifically, Burghardt and Graham list, for instance: motor training, training 
for unexpected events, or instinct practice (2010: 396-398). As Brian Boyd 
stresses,
The more often and the more exuberantly animals play, the more 
they hone skills, widen repertoires, and sharpen sensitivities. 
Play therefore has evolved to be highly self-rewarding. Through 
the compulsiveness of play, animals incrementally alter muscle 
tone and neural wiring, strengthen and increase the processing 
speed of synaptic pathways, and improve their capacity and 
potential for performance in later, less forgiving circumstances. 
(Boyd 2009: 92).
It is the case, then, that – quite literally – we, as all animals, “learn 
through play.” The primary function of it is to train, especially the young, “to 
respond to real-life threats and opportunities,” at the same time amplifying 
their sensimotor skills (Collins 2013: 63). Apart from that, play is a perfect 
context for discharging extra energy that could otherwise lead to actual 
aggression (e.g. Huizinga 1980: 2); it also serves “relaxation” and satisfies 
the “imitative instinct” (Huizinga 1980: 2), “establishes dominance ranking” 
 3 This is the prevailing view in play studies; however, there has also been some evi-
dence that play has short-term benefits as well, especially for young animals (e.g. Fagen and 
Fagen 2004).
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in a given group, and “stimulates inventiveness” of its members (Collins 
2013: 63).
Although play is a universal among animals, it is not the case that 
it happens all the time in all the species. It is going to occur only on the 
condition that the animals engaging in it feel safe. It is going to intensify, 
in turn, in a population which has the access to an optimum of resources, 
both in terms of, for instance, food supplies, as well as the evolved repertoire 
of behaviours adding to their survival success. As Burghardt puts it, when 
delineating his “theory of surplus resource,” play becomes more and more 
common when a population or a species has “excess resources along with 
appropriate evolved motivational, physiological, and ecological systems. Play 
can evolve independently whenever physiological (including neural), life 
history, metabolic, ecological, and psychological conditions, in conjunction 
with a species’ behavioral repertoire, reach a threshold level” (2005: 172). 
All the aforesaid characteristics of play can be summarized in a set 
of  five  criteria,  which  Gordon  M.  Burghardt  provides  in  his  book 
The Genesis of Animal Play: Testing the Limits. In order to be considered 
a play, a particular behaviour is to be (1) structurally different from serious 
behaviour similar to it (2) not fully functional in the context it occurs, 
(3) voluntary, pleasurable, and/or self-rewarding4. Importantly, it is also 
to be (4) initiated in safety, and (5) occurs repeatedly during an animal’s 
life, or at least some span of it (Burghardt 2005: 382). Summing up, it can 
be characterised as “repeated behavior that is incompletely functional in the 
context or at the age in which it is performed and is initiated voluntarily 
when the animal (or person) is in a relaxed or low-stress setting” (Burghardt 
2010: 346).
3. Importance of Play in Humans
In his Study of the Play-Element in Culture, Johan Huizinga famously labelled 
human species Homo Ludens, “Man the Player” (1980). Indeed, it seems that 
play has had a crucial part in the evolution of human culture. Since, as it has 
already been stressed, play demands a kind of a double cognition – seeing 
something as what it actually is, and at the same time seeing it as signifying 
something else – play seems much connected with the development 
 4 It is pleasurable and/or self-rewarding, for it increases the ratio of dopamine (the neu-
rotransmitter for motivating and rewarding) produced in the brain (see: Siviy 1998 in Boyd 
2009: 93).
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of symbolic behaviour in humans, which is probably most evident when 
studying play patterns and use of symbols in children (e.g. Roberts and 
Krause 2002). Play has also been one of the many phenomena that facilitated 
sociality in our species, as it involves mutual “mind reading” and theory 
of mind (Collins 2013: 66). Moreover, as Huizinga puts, “play is more than 
a mere physiological phenomenon or a psychological reflex. It goes beyond 
the confines of purely physical or purely biological activity. It is a significant 
function – that is to say, there is some sense to it. In play there is something 
‘at play’ which transcends the immediate needs of life and imparts meaning 
to the action” (Huizinga 1980: 1).
Indeed, in humans play seems to be of “significant function,” which adds 
up to the fact that they have developed a very wide range of play behaviours, 
“from doodling when bored to risky adventure play” (Burghardt and Graham 
2010: 403). For instance, when writing about children play, Burghardt refers 
to a 1655 engraving by Jacob Catz and instantly lists a whole spectrum 
of play scenarios: 
Like the famous painting on children’s play by Pieter Bruegel, this 
engraving depicts numerous playful activities spanning the range 
of the three categories of play in animals: locomotor/rotational play, 
play with objects, and social play. This figure depicts jumping rope, 
flying kites, walking on stilts, bowling, playing leapfrog, marching 
in a band, riding on a hobby horse, playing blind man’s bluff, and, 
in the lower left corner, playing with dolls and kitchen implements. 
(Burghardt 2010: 340–341)
An interesting stratification of play behaviours in humans, from the most 
private to the most public, has been provided by Brian Sutton-Smith: (A) 
mind or subjective play, such as daydreaming, (B) solitary play, such 
as modelling airplanes or reading, (C) playful behaviours, such as playing 
tricks, (D) informal social play, including jokes, (E) vicarious audience 
play: spectator sports or theatre, (F) performance play: playing voices, (G) 
celebrations and festivals: carnivals, (H) contests: gambling, (I) risky or deep 
play: skateboarding or sky jumping (1997: 5). Collins, in turn, makes a major 
distinction between (A) social play, and (B) language play that evolved from 
social play (2013: 147–148).
What is more, apart from all the possible play forms, there are 
no boundaries to what can be construed as play: as Sutton-Smith stresses, 
“[a]lmost anything can allow play to occur within its boundaries, as is 
illustrated, for example, by works on tourism as play [...], television 
as play [...], day-dreaming as play [...], sexual intimacy as play [...], and 
35Play Frames in Narratives: Some Implications...
even gossip as play” (1997: 3). Apart from developing such a wide range 
of play scenarios, conventionalising some of them and transmitting from one 
generation to another (cf. Huizinga 1980: 9–10), humans have also developed 
a whole repertoire of behaviours accompanying play proper, such as smiling, 
laughing, or singing (Burghardt and Graham 2010: 407). 
4. Art and Storytelling as Play-Pretend
The play repertoire of humans seems also to subsume artistic activity. 
The theory of art as a play – and, specifically, an adaptation which evolved 
from animal play – has been put forward, for example, by Brian Boyd 
in On the Origin of Stories. Evolution, Cognition and Fiction (2009: 91). 
The strong connection between the two behaviours has also been stressed, 
for example, by Huizinga (1980: 158). The main arguments for anchoring 
art in play are: (1) art is a universal in all human populations – as Boyd puts 
it, “[n]o human society lacks art” (2009: 84); (2) engaging in art both on the 
part of the artist creating a work of art and the audience, those that apprehend 
(and, possibly, appreciate) that work of art – entails too high costs to and 
is far too rewarding to be of low adaptive value for the species. In Boyd’s 
words:
If art involved no benefit, if it only mimicked biological advantage, 
as drugs do, by delivering unearned pleasure, yet it had high costs 
in time, energy, and resources, then a predisposition to art would 
be a weakness that would long ago have been weeded out by 
the intensity of evolutionary competition. (Boyd 2009: 83)
Boyd goes a step further and specifies art as “a kind of cognitive play, 
the set of activities designed to engage human attention through their appeal 
to our performance for inferentially rich and therefore patterned information” 
(Boyd 2009: 85). In other words, art is a patterned practice that – unlike some 
similar practices in our species – provides us with a cognitively nourishing 
“open-ended pattern” (Boyd 2009: 89). At this point, Boyd provides 
the example of William Shakespeare’s Henry IV: “[w]e respond almost 
immediately to patterns of characters – Falstaff’s shameless exuberant 
ebullience, Hal’s controlled wildness, Hospur’s impetuousness, Glendower’s 
impassioned boastfulness, and much more [...]. Patterns set up expectations, 
which they may satisfy, overturn, or revise” (Boyd 2009: 90–91).
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The example of Henry IV is not incidental in here. As it has been alluded 
to in the introduction to this paper, one of the behaviours in humans that has 
been analysed in terms of play patterns, is storytelling – or, more specifically 
speaking, literature. Interestingly, the connection between storytelling – 
i.e. composing narratives – and animal play has been unintentionally stressed 
by scholars from outside of evolutionary literary studies. For instance, David 
Herman, in his entry on “cognitive narratology” in The Living Handbook 
of Narratology,  dwells  on  one  of  the  fields  of  research  on  narratives  – 
transmedial studies – as analysing stories across media due to the narrative 
frame, or “macroframe” that enables recognising them as such (Herman 2011), 
frames, as we will see in the subsequent section, being an essential element 
of recognising play as play – and, accordingly, storytelling as storytelling.
As far as language and storytelling practices are concerned, Christopher 
Collins  defines  animal  play  as  “a  framed,  scripted  episode  within  which 
particular sign values are transformed” (2013: 63). As such, storytelling can 
certainly be conceived of as a social play (when the storyteller addresses 
an audience) or a private play (in structural terms probably resembling 
an object play, in which an individual tells a story to him/herself). In the case 
of private cognitive-object play, the object is to be a narrative and its material 
realisation – i.e. language in verbal or, for instance, visual representations 
in non-verbal narratives.
Storytelling, once understood in terms of play-pretend, can also 
be linked with certain characteristics of animal play; it is, for instance, a kind 
of a social display, or a means of establishing dominance rankings. That 
is true especially about literature, as both writing it as well as reading it – 
expressly “high” works of the canon – boosts social status and is associated 
with prestige. Also, storytelling – just as animal play in terms of sensimotor 
skills – hones some of our capacities: in the case of verbal storytelling, it is 
plausible to think, for instance, of honing language or social competence. 
5. Play Frame
One of the intuitions about play, based on observation, is that it is “secluded,” 
“limited” (Huizinga 1980: 9), somehow cut off from the rest of the “serious” 
reality. As Christopher Collins puts it, “[f]or animals, human and nonhuman 
alike, play has always constituted one recognizable type of extended episode, 
distinct from the everyday routines of biological maintenance and survival” 
(2013: 63). This episode occurs only within a certain cognitive frame, 
in which the usual reasoning is restrained by particular play-rules (Huizinga 
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1980: 152). The question is, then, how do animals know that it is the play-
rules that they should abide by at a particular point? Or, to use Bekoff and 
Byers’ words: “How do animals read play intention in conspecific?” (Bekoff 
and Byers 1998: xvi). How do they know that what is about to happen should 
involve not single, as usual, but double cognition? An interesting model has 
been proposed by Gregory Bateson, according to whom play is preceded by 
a pre-play exchange (Bateson 1972: 185). Such an exchange usually takes 
the form of “metacommunication,” employing “signals which would carry 
the message ‘this is play’” (Bateson 1972: 185). 
A metacommunication signal invites “the addressee to enter into what 
Bateson called a ‘play frame’, [...] within which actions (e.g. chasing, 
nipping, and sparring) would not indicate that sort of hostility that might 
otherwise lead to injury or death” (Collins 2013: 65). In terms of semiotics, 
a metacommunication signal is, then, a kind of a pre-index subverting 
the meaning of all the signals that follow5. 
Apart from pre-play exchange, signals can also be cued during the play 
as such, especially when the play intention is misinterpreted or the play 
frame is apt to collapse; then, metacommunication signals serve to maintain 
the frame and reassure the co-player that whatever happens is not “serious” 
(cf. Bekoff 1995).
Metacommunication seems especially significant  in  the case of social 
play. As Burghardt and Graham point,
Maintaining social play requires that players be highly attuned 
to the rapidly changing nature of the play bout. Players must 
read social cues appropriately, react swiftly and accurately 
to movements, and anticipate responses. Hence, play signals 
have evolved in many species that act as behavioral cues or 
honest reassurances that the behavior is playful. Typical play 
signals include play bows in canids and open-mouthed play faces 
in primates and carnivorans. (Bekoff 1975; Pellis and Pellis 1996 
In Burghardt and Graham 2010: 395).
 5 As Collins notes, “[i]n semiotic terms, the metacommunication is a preliminary index 
that negates in advance all subsequent indices of [for instance] aggression [...] and transforms 
them into mutually recognized icons of [for instance] aggression” (Collins 2013: 66) – indexi-
cal communication that precedes the act of play; such an episode means “I invite you to enact 
with me a script in which what we two do will indicate aggression but not lead to injury, 
because we agree that it merely looks as though it indicates it” (Collins 2013: 66).
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The ability to read these “social cues” translates onto something 
of a play competence of an individual. These, together with the play patterns 
themselves, can – and in humans certainly do – become conventionalised 
and transmitted (Huizinga 1980: 9–10).
The “social cues” for play most thoroughly described in literature include 
vocalisations observed in many fissiped carnivorans, such as chirrups in rats 
(e.g. Knutson et al. 1998 In Burghardt and Graham 2010: 407). Vocalising 
is not, however, the only way to signal play intention. In order to signal 
and maintain social play, canids, for instance, bow during play sequences 
(Bekoff 1995). Just as play in itself can be covert (cf. Burghardt 2010: 351), 
there are also other, more covert strategies for signalling and maintaining 
a play frame. In canids, in a R&T play, bites that are too gentle to hurt are 
an instant indicator that the rough-and-tumble is not for real (Bekoff 1995). 
In humans, these can include, for instance, smiling or laughing (cf. Burghardt 
and Graham 2010: 407). It is also vital to acknowledge the fact that although 
play as such is always volitional, a metacommunication signal does not 
necessarily need to be conscious (Bateson 1972: 185). 
What is also important, as Collins remarks, it is only in social play, 
i.e. play in which there are two or more participants, that a metacommunication 
signal is necessary (2013: 65). It does not mean, however, that in the case 
of an individual involved in an object or locomotor play on their own, there 
is no need for demarcating the play frame. In such a situation, the play 
frame is still being secured; it is just that the signal for it is issued within 
the cognitive apparatus of the one and only player and, clearly, it does not 
need to be transmitted to the outside.
Yet another possible problem about determining a play frame is that 
play does certainly contain a very strong subjective component: as, for 
example, Burghardt stresses, play is play when the players (or the observers) 
subjectively identify it as such (2005: 14).
6. Framing Narratives
Assuming that storytelling is anchored in play (cf. Boyd 2009; Collins 2013), 
the same processes of exchanging a metacommunication signal and only then 
engaging in play-pretend should apply to narratives6. For the purposes of this 
 6  For  the  sake  of  disambiguation,  I would  like  to  briefly  define what  is  herein  un-
derstood by “a story” and “a narrative,” since the two are sometimes used interchangeably, 
although they are only partial synonyms (Ryan 2007: 22). A story is a conceptualised chrono-
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paper,  I define a narrative after  the founding father of narratology, Gérard 
Genette, as of threefold meaning: (1) “the narrative statement, the oral or 
written discourse that undertakes to tell of an event or a series of events,” 
(2) “the succession of events,  real or fictitious,  that are  the subject of  this 
discourse,” and (3) “an event: not, however, the event that is recounted, but 
the event that consists of someone recounting something: the act of narrating 
taken in itself” (Genette 1980: 25–26). The meaning of a narrative, 
as understood herein, can be then comprised in David Herman’s unpretentious 
definition as conveying a story to somebody else in a manner different from 
description (Herman 2007: 8–9).
As Aristotle famously stated in Poetics, a narrative needs to have 
a “beginning, middle, and end” (Aristotle in Richardson 2002: 2; Collins 
2013: 63). Applying that to the study of storytelling as play, Collins 
remarks: “Whatever I happen to do before I start and after I end frames 
this activity, which, while I am doing it, constitutes a particular routine, 
or ‘script’” (2013: 63). How is such a frame founded? 
An interesting procedure has been unintentionally described by Arthur 
W. Frank, who in order to verify whether a given account had a potential 
to be a story, decided to tell it to his daughters in a “bedtime test”: As he 
notes,
If a self-respecting six- or eight-year old asks for a story before 
bedtimes, would she or he accept this as a story? Some narrations 
that are surprisingly close to Tilly’s technical accounts might pass 
the bedtime test. My younger daughter used to ask for a story 
about how dinosaurs became extinct [...]. My best guess is that 
the  narrations  qualified  as  bedtime  stories  because  they  aroused 
a  sufficient  degree  of  imagination.  My  daughter  could  imagine 
the earth growing darker after being struck by a meteor, dust filling 
the air, food growing scarce... (Frank 2010: 41–42)
In this case, it seems important that the storyteller has been asked 
for telling a story. Such a request automatically sets the ground for a play 
frame. But there are many types of narratives, and each of them may require 
a different framing design. 
logical sequence of events incorporating an agent (or agents), a spatial and a temporal dimen-
sions. Once a story, as something conceptual, is transmitted – via any medium – it is automati-
cally composed into a narrative. Thus, “a story” and “a narrative” can be used interchangeably 
only when to designate “storytelling” as “composing narratives” (cf. Abbott 2007).
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First of all, the design differs, as we distinguish between narratives that 
we tell others and narratives that we tell to our own selves. As Marie-Laure 
Ryan points, referring to psychologist Jerome Bruner and philosopher Galen 
Strawson, we all incessantly work on “an internal autobiography,” organising 
our lives as stories, and also making sense of the outside world in our 
private narratives (Ryan 2009: 310). In this sense – the context of privacy or 
seclusion – private narratives resemble more of an object play than a social 
play. An individual creates his/her own play frame and fills it with a story 
similarly to a cat playing with a yarn ball. Public narratives, on the other hand, 
are a social play proper, i.e. they engage more than one player (cf. Ryan 310–
311). Apart from literature – i.e. verbal, literary narratives – public narratives 
include, for instance, conversational storytelling. As Neal R. Norrick notes, 
“[w]e tell stories to make a point, to catch up on each other’s lives, to report 
news, and to entertain each other” (2007: 127). We also narrate in the public 
to back up our beliefs and norms, adding up to ideologies (see, e.g.: Barthes 
1977a; Herman and Vervaeck 2007), or tell bedtime stories to children 
(e.g. Frank 2010: 41). 
Second, narratives can be classified on the basis of the medium they use. 
Each medium,  from oral or written  text  to visual  forms,  including film or 
mime, enables and depends upon different strategies for establishing a play 
frame. And there are also different narrative genres (e.g. Herman 2002: 91), 
such as a fairy tale or a detective story7, all built around distinct conventions. 
And, again, each convention calls for a compatible framing. Characterising 
framing narratives is, then, at least as complicated as providing a taxonomy 
of all the narrative media, types, genres and sub-genres. 
The major difference in all the narrative frames depends, to a great 
extent, on the kind of metacommunication signal sent. In the case of private 
narratives, just as in an individual object play, founding a play frame does 
not need to be communicated to the outside; the metacommunication signal – 
if it is issued at all – is, then, circulated within the player’s own cognitive 
apparatus. A metacommunication signal proper occurs in public narratives, 
though. Such signals can include, for instance, conventionalised phrases, 
such as “Let me tell you a story” in the case of a conversational narrative, or 
“Once upon a time” in the case of a fairy tale. 
 7 Narratives have also been studied as applicable not only to art of literature, but also 
historical sciences, psychology, psychoanalysis, philosophy, pedagogy, law studies, or medi-
cine (Meuter 2011). In fact, the term “a narrative” has been the object of interest of so many 
disciplines (cf. Herman 2007: 4) that it has developed most surprising sub-types, such as, 
for instance, “illness narrative”: a concept from psychology and sociology, see, for exam-
ple: Douglas Ezzy (2000) or Mike Bury (2001).
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These are quite overt signals; but the metacommunication signal does 
not need to be direct, as in “This is play” example used by Bateson (1972). 
The signal establishing a play frame for a narrative can be more covert 
than a simple “A Short Story” or “A Novel” following the title. The more 
the audience or the readers are familiar with the medium and the kind 
of language used for a particular narrative – in other words, the higher their 
narrative and play competence is – the more they are likely to recognize 
even implicit signals. Such covert signalling can comprise, for example, 
the use of a play-based device of an allegory or a symbol: e.g. a personified 
animal from a fairy tale standing for a particular type of a person. As long 
as the audience is able to recognise it as a play device, they are also able 
to recognise the whole of the piece as framed for play.
This can be best seen once the audience actually fails to identify 
the covert metacommunication signalling and subsequently does not 
recognise the play frame. In Storytelling and the Sciences of Mind, David 
Herman alludes, though in a different context, to the famous incident when 
Orson Welles’s adaptation of H. G. Wells’s The War of Two Worlds (1898) 
was broadcasted on the radio. The account of Martians invading the Earth 
induced an actual outburst of panic among the audience. Sometimes, 
as Jonathan Gottschall stresses, “[p]retend play is deadly serious fun” 
(2012: 32). Especially, when the players do not know they are playing. 
As Herman notes, the broadcast was on Halloween, which would make 
it plausible to presume it was all a prank; what is more, it was taken 
seriously “despite the announcer’s opening reference to Wells’s novel 
and despite the action being set one year in the future, in 1939” (Herman 
2013: 8). However, there were people who – probably due to their high play 
competence or what we would conventionally call just “common sense” – 
did not take the war of two worlds seriously: for instance, Herman’s 
grandfather, when listening to the broadcast, mindfully concluded that if 
it was true, it would be on all the radio channels, and not just one (Herman 
2013: 9).
It seems that in narratives, apart from being fairly covert, such framing 
can also be delayed. It may be the case that the convention – and thus the play 
frame – is not at once recognisable. It is but after a couple of pages that 
the reader recognises play elements in the text, such as the use of a poetic 
device, and only then does the play proper commence. It is also after 
a couple of pages that the reader notices yet another metacommunication 
signal characteristic of storytelling play-pretend: a purposeful anachrony 
in the plot, i.e. a discrepancy between the order of events in the story and 
the order in which they are presented in a narratives (cf. Genette 2002: 26). 
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Such a discrepancy is characteristic of narratives and does not occur, for 
instance, in descriptions (cf. Abbott 2011). 
Framing depends also on media and conventions for narratives that are 
frames in themselves. Coming back to Huizinga’s point on ritualising and 
transmitting play patterns and metacommunication signals for them, we can 
claim that some types of narratives have been used and re-used in the course 
of human history, accordingly creating schemas that have been culturally 
transmitted. Thus, when we, for instance, go to a cinema, the schema for this 
ritual itself is an index for play. We know what to expect: we know we will 
see a visual narrative of one genre or another. 
7. Conclusion
As is evident from the above, establishing a play frame in the case of narratives 
depends on a number of factors, from the medium to the particular devices 
used. Importantly, it seems that metacommunication signals in narratives can, 
for the most part, be found at a metanarrative level. The higher the narrative 
competence of the players is then, the more covert the signalling can be. 
There is still much to be specified with reference to storytelling as play. This 
paper is of fairly theoretical character; its primary aim has been, however, 
to point to the fact that modelling human storytelling activities as cognitively 
anchored in animal play is by no means the end of the story. It seems that 
framing a narrative as a complex cultural construct demanding double 
cognition is just as complicated as the routines for signalling play in animals. 
As Bekoff analysed play signalling in canids and provided an in-depth 
description of the intensity and rates of bows that establish and reassure play 
frames in the species, it is perhaps just equally possible to observe, measure, 
and empirically test the different play frame designs that humans use while 
telling stories. This – and much more relevant research – still seems a work 
in progress, though.
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